When Donald J. Trump quietly dispatched envoy Steve Witkoff to Moscow in early 2025 to negotiate a prisoner swap, few noticed the historical echo. But insiders recognized it: just as Henry Kissinger sneaked into Beijing in 1971, Trump’s team is testing whether a Reverse Nixon strategy can pry Russia away from China—and turn the Kremlin into a reluctant ally against Beijing. The twist? This time, the target isn’t the Soviet Union. It’s the world’s most dangerous bilateral partnership in decades.
The Original Nixon Playbook—Flipped
In 1972, Richard Nixon stunned the world by visiting China, ending 25 years of diplomatic isolation. The goal? Isolate the USSR by exploiting the Sino-Soviet split, which had boiled over in bloody border clashes in 1969. It worked. The Kremlin suddenly faced encirclement. The Cold War shifted. Now, Donald J. Trump and his inner circle—Elon Musk, Tulsi Gabbard, and Secretary of State Marco Antonio Rubio—are trying to reverse that logic. Instead of using China to weaken Russia, they want to use Russia to weaken China. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, this isn’t fantasy. It’s policy. "The Trump administration has been quite open about why exactly it wants to get into bed with Moscow," their March 1, 2025 analysis noted. "It believes closer ties will prize Russia away from China, which it sees as the real existential threat to the United States."Why It’s Not That Simple
Here’s the problem: Russia isn’t the Soviet Union. And China isn’t the isolated, impoverished state Nixon dealt with. Today, Beijing is the world’s second-largest economy, a tech powerhouse, and Moscow’s most reliable partner in a world increasingly hostile to its aggression. The International Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (ICDS) in Estonia put it bluntly: "China is now more powerful than Russia and has become Washington’s primary strategic concern." That’s why Putin isn’t rushing to trade his alliance with Beijing for a handshake with Trump. As Vladimir Putin told former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in private: "I have no illusion about the US." Even when Trump asked Abe to relay messages about readmitting Russia to the G7, Putin remained cold. He knows the West’s patience is thin—and he knows China won’t abandon him.The Ukraine Trap
The biggest obstacle? Ukraine. The FULCRUM research institute in Singapore argues that Trump can’t possibly meet Russia’s demands for peace: permanent recognition of occupied Ukrainian territories and a guarantee that Ukraine will never join NATO. "It’s not just about politics," one analyst told us. "It’s about American public opinion. Polls show 72% of Americans still support Ukraine. The Senate’s bipartisan sanctions coalition is stronger than ever." Even as Trump’s team pushes for talks, the White House quietly approved another $2.3 billion in military aid to Kyiv in February. That’s not the behavior of someone negotiating a grand bargain. It’s the behavior of someone hedging bets.
Who’s Really Winning?
The Heritage Foundation argues that Trump isn’t pursuing a Reverse Nixon at all. "The circumstances are entirely different," they wrote. "The Cold War had ideological fissures. Today, Beijing and Moscow share autocratic values, military cooperation, and a mutual hatred of Western liberal order." And here’s the irony: every time Trump signals openness to Moscow, he strengthens the Sino-Russian bond. Beijing watches closely. When Washington reaches out to Russia, China doubles down on its own military drills, energy deals, and tech partnerships with Moscow. In 2024, bilateral trade between Beijing and Moscow hit $240 billion—a 30% increase from the year before. That’s not a partnership under strain. That’s a marriage in growth.What’s the Real Strategy?
Maybe Trump’s team knows the Reverse Nixon gambit won’t work. Maybe they’re just using the *idea* of it to create chaos in Beijing’s calculations. Or maybe they’re laying groundwork for a future pivot—away from Europe and toward Asia. The Heritage Foundation suggests the real plan isn’t splitting Russia from China. It’s building alternatives: strengthening the Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia), deepening ties with India, and creating minilateral defense pacts across the Indo-Pacific. In other words: don’t break the Russia-China alliance. Just make it irrelevant.
What’s Next?
The next flashpoint? The G7 summit in June. Trump has publicly pushed for Russia’s return. Germany and France are refusing. If Putin shows up uninvited—or if Trump unilaterally invites him—expect a transatlantic crisis. Meanwhile, Beijing is quietly preparing its own response: a major military exercise in the Sea of Japan, timed to coincide with U.S. naval drills near Taiwan. The Cold War taught us that alliances shift. But they don’t break easily when both sides have everything to lose. Right now, Russia and China aren’t just allies. They’re partners in survival.Frequently Asked Questions
Is a Reverse Nixon strategy even possible today?
Unlikely. Unlike the 1970s, when China and the USSR were locked in violent rivalry, today’s Russia and China share deep economic, military, and ideological alignment. China is now the greater threat to U.S. interests, and Moscow knows it. Putin won’t trade his partnership with Beijing for vague U.S. promises—especially when China offers $240 billion in annual trade and zero demands on Ukraine.
Why does the U.S. keep sending weapons to Ukraine if it wants peace with Russia?
It’s a balancing act. The White House is signaling to both Moscow and Beijing that the U.S. won’t abandon Ukraine, even while exploring backchannel talks. Sending $2.3 billion in aid in February 2025 shows domestic political constraints remain powerful. Any deal with Russia would require Ukraine’s consent—which Kyiv won’t give without Western guarantees.
What role does China play in Russia’s calculations?
China is Russia’s lifeline. With Western sanctions crippling its economy, Moscow relies on Beijing for energy exports, weapons components, and financial workarounds. In 2024, over 80% of Russia’s oil exports went to China. Putin has no incentive to jeopardize that. Even if Trump offered sanctions relief, China’s leverage is too great—and too useful—to abandon.
Could Trump’s approach backfire?
Absolutely. Every overture to Moscow signals weakness to Beijing, encouraging China to accelerate its military modernization and expand influence in Africa, Latin America, and the Pacific. The Carnegie Endowment warns that Moscow may play along with Trump just to extract concessions—then return to Beijing with more leverage, not less.
What alternatives is the U.S. pursuing instead?
The Heritage Foundation and other analysts point to "minilateral" coalitions: the Quad (U.S., Japan, India, Australia), expanded NATO partnerships in the Indo-Pacific, and deeper defense ties with South Korea and the Philippines. The goal isn’t to split Russia and China—it’s to build a network of allies that makes Beijing’s ambitions too costly to pursue.
How does public opinion in the U.S. affect this strategy?
It’s a major constraint. Polls from Pew and Gallup show 70%+ of Americans still support Ukraine and oppose normalizing relations with Russia. Even within Trump’s own party, key senators like Bob Menendez and Lindsey Graham have threatened new sanctions if Moscow gets concessions on Ukraine. That’s why any deal remains secret—because it wouldn’t survive public scrutiny.